This paper, using 833 observations of listed Japanese firms between the years 1992 to 2000, explore the implications of the free cash flow hypothesis concerning the disciplinary role of ownership structure in corporate capital structure policy. The results show (1) The relation between leverage and free cash flow are significantly positive and greater for low-growth firms than for the high-growth firms. (2) In the firms with low growth opportunities, institutional investors discourage managerial overspending by governance process and hence compensate for the debt monitoring. The managerial ownership may align the interest of shareholders and mangers and also compensates for the leverage. In the firms with high growth opportunities, institutional investors encourage higher leverage. (3) Keiretsu classification affects relations between ownership structure and leverage. Overall, the results generally support the hypothesis that conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers vary with growth opportunities and free cash flow and there is disciplinary role of ownership structure in capital structure policy.
Introduction
The agency costs of free cash flow arise from a conflict between managers and shareholders.
When managers insulate themselves from internal and external governance mechanism, they have incentives to pursue their own interests at the expenses of shareholders, e.g.
higher-than-market salaries, excessive perquisites, job security. Managers also tend to value investments even if the investments can not maximize shareholders' value since managers gain prestige being the managers of a big firm. This behavior is known as overinvestment problem in the literature. Jensen (1986) discussed the agency cost of free cash flow. Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fun all projects that have positive NPV. He says managers may use free cash flow to invest in negative NPV projects rather than return the free cash flow to the shareholders, for example as dividends. This problem is especially bad in firms who are mature and have few growth opportunities, as they have few profitable investments. However, by increasing debt with its required interest payments, managers are "bonding their promise to pay out future cash flows".
Jensen indicates that firms with excess cash flows and low growth opportunities will use more debt financing for monitoring purposes. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that a manager, who owns a fraction, α, of the firm's outstanding equity, bears α fraction of the cost of his divergent behavior. Jensen (1986) argues that waste of corporate resources is an important instance of such behavior. As α increases, so does a manager's incentive to avoid corporate waste. This argument implies that the agency costs of free cash flow are decreasing function of α. Managers' equity ownership serves as another mechanism, in addition to debt, for reducing the agency costs of free cash flow. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shareholders have an incentive to monitor managers. Pound (1988) suggests that institutional investors serve as an alternative mechanism to control the overinvestment problem. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) indicate that institutional investors provide valuable monitoring services and act as a restraint to opportunistic behavior by managers.
Thus, institutional investors may help in reducing the firm's agency cost and become a substitute for debt if institutions can monitor managerial activities at a low cost.
In this study, we investigate the implications of free cash flow theory in capital structure policy of listed Japanese firms. The paper focuses specially on relations between leverage and free cash flow and growth opportunities and how the sensitivity of relations varies with ownership structure.
The interest in studying Japanese firms stems from three factors.
First, the ownership structure of Japanese firms is quite different from the U.S. firms'. Financial institutions predominate among the top five shareholders, and take significantly larger equity position in firms than they do in the U.S. Unlike U.S. banks, Japanese banks are allowed to hold voting stock in the firms to which they lend. Most large industrial firms developed a main bank relationship with one of the major banks. The banks maintain very close contact with borrowers, often have board representation and are frequently involved in major decisions or substantial changes in company policy. In the event of financial distress, banks have virtually unlimited access to corporate records and may place officers directly in top management positions. Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994) Hoshi, Kashyap, and Loveman(1994) and Teranishi(1993) portray the close ties between finance and industry in Japan as an important factor in the international competitiveness of modern Japanese firms. They argue that close bank-firm relationship can solve agency problems of managerial behavior as well as problems of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers.
Some studies suggest the existence of negative components within the main bank system. Prowse (1990) suggests that because large shareholders are also larger debtholders, they may preclude policies that attempt to transfer wealth from debtholders to shareholders. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) examine the effects of bank-firm relationship on firm performance in Japan. When access to capital markets is limited, close bank-firm ties increase the availability of capital to borrowing firms, but do not lead to higher profitability or growth. The cost of capital of firms with close bank ties is higher than that of their peers. This indicates that banks could use their monopoly power both to extract significant rents from their client firms through interest payments, and to inhibit their growth through conservative investment policies.
The liberalization of financial markets also reduces the bank's market power. During the 1980s the Japanese financial system underwent a process of dramatic deregulation and liberalization which made corporate borrowing and raising equity in both domestic and foreign capital markets much easier and more common. With access to foreign markets, and more developed domestic capital markets, Japanese firms gained alternative to bank debt. This fact dramatically reduces the main bank's influence over the firm's policies and consequently weakens the keiretsu relationship among member firms. With relatively weak influence over the firms' policies by the main bank, managers of these firms are relatively free to pursue self-interest. The agent-principal conflicts are likely to be a major concern to date.
-4-Second, there exist differences between keiretsu or industrial groups centered around affiliated banks and financial institutions and unaffiliated independent firms with weaker banking ties.
Japanese industrial organization is characterized by groups of enterprises (keiretsu) composed of firms based in different industries but bound by ties of fractional ownership and reliant on a large commercial bank as the major but not sole lender. The large shareholders of keiretsu firms often are also large creditors of the firm as well as important long-term commercial business partners.
The keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms are facing different liquidity constraints in their investment spending. Investment spending is very sensitive to liquidity constrains for non-keiretsu firms, but not so for keiretsu firms. Since keiretsu firms are likely to have better access to financing sources, keiretsu firms seemingly face less liquidity constraints in making investment decision.
The differences in institutional arrangements between keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms may influence the behavior of shareholders as monitors. Kester (1990) describes the corporate governance system of keiretsu firms in terms of a complex interaction between shareholdings, credit holding and long-term business relationship that exist between the firm and its stake holders. Aoki, Patric, and Sheard (1994) , and Berglof and Perotti (1994) suggest a two-tier monitor system. In the first stage, corporate cross-shareholders serve as the monitors under normal circumstances. Member firms are in a unique and advantageous position to serve as mutual monitors because they can observe each others' performance through their business relations and because they have specific industry knowledge. This constant interaction allows for better performance evaluation than what can be achieved through centralized monitoring.
Therefore, corporate mutual monitoring represents a crucial mechanism to ensure firms operate in a manner consistent with all shareholders' interest. An example of the first-stage monitoring is the Presidents' Council. In the second stage, the financial institutions take an active intervention role when member firms get into financial distress. The main bank is frequently updated on the financial health of member firms through their debt repayments, while an outside investor has only limited ability to update information. In addition, Aoki and Sheard (1994) assert that main banks serve as useful safety nets in times of crisis because they have the funds and expertise to assume the responsibility. In simple cases, existing debt is refinanced and some bridge financing is provided. In more serious cases, the main bank replaces incumbent managers and requires restructuring and liquidation of assets.
Finally, the literature provides mixed guidance on the role of managerial ownership in the corporate governance of Japanese firms. Because the well-known keiretsu structure and influential bank shareholders, the agency problems between Japanese managers and shareholders are considered to be minimal (e.g. Nakatani (1984) , Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990,1991) and Prowse (1990) ). The manager ownership, as a way of aligning interests between managers and shareholders, has been viewed as an unnecessary corporate governance mechanism. This may mean greater reliance in Japan on direct shareholder monitoring, which may be reflected in the higher levels of ownership concentration observed in Japan. (e.g. Kang and shivdasani (1995) , Kaplan (1994) , and Prowse (1992) ).
-5-However Kang and Stulz (1998) , Mock and Nakamura (1999) , and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) questioned the effectiveness of bank oversight in Japan. Morck and Nakamura (1999) argue that for independent firms, bank equity holders pursue their interests as creditors at the expense of their equity claims. In addition, as banks are primarily concerned with the firm's ability to meet their debt responsibilities, banks are less involved with riskier firms ( Nakatani (1984) and Weinstein and Yafeh 91998) ). Gibson(1995) and Kang and Stulz (1998) also argue that poor bank health may adversely affect their dependent firms' investment prospects, which, in turn, would affect their ability to monitor effectively. This particular contention is especially relevant to the late 1980's and early 1990's as it is well known that Japanese banks have been experiencing significant financial difficulties during this time period. In light of these findings, Morck and Nakamura (1999) contend that some independent firms may require corporate control mechanisms other than bank oversight. Due to the decline in power of Japanese banks, the rarity of incentive-based compensation contracts for Japanese managers, and the fact that many Japanese firms are not affiliated with a keiretsu group, the managerial-ownership may represents an alternative mechanism to ensure that firms operate efficiently.
Thus, the unique Japanese institutional arrangements provide an interesting backdrop to investigate whether cash flow theory explanation for debt policy still apply given the differences.
Tests using a sample of 833 observations from year 1992 to 2000 support the free cash flow theory's predictions in the relation between leverage and free cash flow, growth opportunities.
The results also reveal that the institutional investors impose their monitoring preferences through the governance process.
Two features distinguish this study. First, it provides evidence consistent with free cash flow theory predictions in a legal and regulatory environment that is different form that in the US.
Second, previous researches focus only on the degree of institutional ownership. However, the characteristics and intensity of monitoring may vary across institutional investors to affect corporate financing outcomes. Given the prevalence of institutional ownership in Japanese firms, we focus on the identity of large block shareholders, i.e. the bank ownership, non-bank financial ownership and business corporate ownership. This study enhances our understanding of the behavior of the modern corporation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents theory and hypothesis relating leverage, free cash flow, growth opportunities and ownership structure. Section 3 explains the data and methodology and describes the sample characteristics. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 makes conclusions.
Literature review and Hypotheses

Literature review
-6- Jensen (1986) identified the conflict between the shareholders' interests and the managers' individual agendas and suggested the debt is a remedy against this form of agency costs: as debt forces the company to pay out the excessive cash flow, it decreases the free cash flow which is at managers' discretion and thus in danger of being suboptimally invested. Stulz (1990) shows that it is optimal for shareholders to increase leverage when managers have personal objectives.
There are a number of studies that investigate the free cash flow hypothesis. One strain of empirical work examine the overinvestment problem by analyzing the relation between growth opportunities and free cash flow on the one hand, and leverage on the other hand. They find the predicted negative relation between debt and growth opportunities (Smith and Watts (1992) ; Lang, Ofek and Stulz(1996) ) and changes in free cash flow lead to positive changes in leverage (Crutchley and Jensen (1996) ). Another approach to the implications of the free cash flow hypothesis in corporate capital structure policy is to study specific events that after capital structure and show that in general the firms acted according to free cash flow theory (Denis and Denis (1993); Blanchard, Silanes, and Shleifer( 1994) ). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managerial equity ownership reduces managerial incentives to engage in nonoptimal behavior. As managerial ownership increases, managers bear more of the wealth effects of their divergent behaviors. Thus the disciplinary pressures of leverage and managerial ownership are substitutes. Some previous studies find a significantly negative relation between the leverage and managerial ownership (Friend and Lang (1988) ; Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992) ; Chen and Steiner (1999) ). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Pound (1988) suggest that institutional investors serve as an alternative mechanism to control the overinvestment problem. Institutional investors have greater expertise in gathering and interpreting information on firms, and have more incentives to closely oversee managerial activities with an increase in their equity ownership. This implies that institutional ownership and leverage serve as substitutes in controlling managerial self-interest if institutional investors impose their managerial preferences through the governance process.
Some evidence suggests that there exists a negative relation between institutional ownership and leverage. (Grier and Zychowicz (1994); Bathala , Moon, and Rao (1994) ; Crutchley and Jensen (1996) ).
Summary of Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical work of Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) , the following hypotheses apply.
Hypothesis 1: Leverage is negatively related to growth opportunities and positively related to free cash flow. The relation between free cash flow and leverage is stronger for firms with low growth than firms with high growth.
-7-Hypothesis 2: The leverage should be negatively related to managerial ownership and institutional ownership in the firms with severe overinvestment problem. To be included in the sample for further analysis, we require that the data on equity ownership are available. The data on equity ownership are taken from Japan Company Handbook. In addition, the keiretsu classification is obtained from database provided by Wu and Xu (2002 
The two-equation model
One concern over estimating the impact of ownership structure on leverage is the possibility of reverse causation from current leverage to current equity ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that ownership concentrations are a result of a profit maximizing function, thus suggesting that ownership structure is endogenous to firm specific characteristics. Similarly, Cho (1998) suggest that managers may be holding more of their firm's shares when they expect their firms to perform well. This also implies that the direction of causality is such that corporate value is affecting ownership structure. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1998) also provide additional evidence that ownership structure is endogenous of firm-specific characteristics. In this study, managers are assumed to have control over the levels of debt and managerial ownership of equity in the firm. Hence, the leverage ratio and managerial ownership are the dependent variables. Institutional holdings are specified as an exogenous variable since they are external to the firm-not management decision variable. 
Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992) specify 3-equation system for leverage, ownership structure and dividends. Here we do not include a dividend equation in our investigation for two reasons.
First, Jensen, Solberg and Zorn only finds limited evidence that debt, insider ownership and dividends are interdependent. Second, the agency literature recognizes the multiple devices to control agency costs such as debt policy, dividend policy, investment policy, incentive contracts, market takeover, capital and product markets. However, from an empirical standpoint, including more endogenous variables would make the model unwieldy. In the interest of keeping the model relatively simple, the model is confined to the capital and ownership structure of the firm.
The one year lag model
An alternative methodology to control for reverse causality is to include a one year lag between leverage and ownership structure and all other explanatory variables. It also help to address the problem of spurious correlation between the first version of debt ratio and growth opportunities since both are dependent on stock price measured on the same date. The specification of lagged model is given below: RSTD=standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a five year period.
A more detailed discussion of the variables, their measurement, and hypothesized signs for the explanatory variables follows.
Leverage Equation
Leverage. Following Prowse(1990) The numerator represents the book value of total debt outstanding. A large portion of Japanese firms' debt is typically classified as short-term bank debt because the interest rate floats with short-term rates. Much of this lending carries with it a long-term commitment and thus is included in the measure of debt. Also, Japanese corporate balance sheets present unusually high accounts receivable and payable. To adjust for this, the excess of receivable over payable is deducted form total debt. Lehn and Poulsen(1989) . Their measure of FCF is the operating income before depreciation minus taxes, interest expenses, and preferred and common dividends. Thus, the measure used in this study as a proxy for FCF is defined as: FCF = ( Operating income before depreciation-Tax-Gross interest expenses on short-term and long term debt-Total dividend on preferred shares-total dividend on ordinary shares)/Book value of total assets ; Growth Opportunities. The firms' growth opportunities that are inherently unobservable (Yoon and Starks, 1995) . The market-to-book ratio is a growth measure used most frequently by researchers (Smith and Watts, 1992; Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997; Harford, 1999) . Thus, the measure used in this study as a proxy for growth opportunities is the market-to-book ratio, which is defined as: GROWTH = (Book value of assets -Book value of equity +Market value of equity)/Book value of assets
We also employ several control variables because other factors are known to explain leverage variations ( Harris and Raviv,1991) . The variables we use in regression analyses and their theoretical justifications are presented below.
-11-Profitability. Several studies find a negative relation between leverage level and profitability ( Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn(1992) , Kester (1986) , Titman and Wessels (1988) . The reason is that more-profitable firms are in a position to rely on internally generated funds (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . We use the ratio of operating income to sales as a proxy for profitability.
Collateral values. Secured debt gives lenders title to pledged assets until debt is fully paid.
Because creditors can take possession of fixed assets, they can avoid the legal processes that, in the event of bankruptcy, are required for unsecured creditors. This implies a positive relation between debt measures and the capacity of firms to collateralize their debt. Kester (1986) , Prowse(1990) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Wald (1999) provides empirical support for this relation in Japan. We use the sum of inventory and net plant, equipment, and land over total assets as measure of collateral assets in the firm.
Firm Size. Larger firms are argued to be more diversified and less prone to bankrupt than smaller firms. As a result, they have the ability to support more debt. Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992) find empirical support for this hypothesis. In addition, Hodder and Tschoegl(1985) argue that the Japanese government disproportionately directs funds to large firms, who borrow heavily. These contentions suggest a positive relation between firm size and leverage. We use the natural logarithm of total assets as measure of size.
R&D. Myers (1977) present a model in which outstanding debt causes underinvestment in future opportunities. If the firm has capital entrenched in physical plant, the potential for underinvestment or excessive risk taking by management is reduced. Thus, measures of physical plant are expected to increase the debt ratio of a firm. Symmetrically, firm's expense on intellectual goods, such as R&D, are expected to decrease the debt ratio. R&D may carry additional tax deductions. The coefficient should be negative to debt ratios. Wald (1999) find negative coefficient of R&D.
ADVER. Titman (1984) argues that the firm's liquidation imposes costs on customers and employees. Since firms with unique products impose relatively high costs from liquidation on customers and employees, uniqueness of the assts is expected to be negatively related to leverage.
Uniqueness of the assets is measured by R&D and ADVER. Thus a negative sign is expected.
Non-debt tax shields. DeAngelo and Masulis(1980) suggest that various forms of nondebt tax shields, including depreciation charges, can substitute for corporate debt. thus, other things being equal, they expect a negative relation between debt levels and the availability of nondebt tax shields. They suggest that firms that invest heavily in tangible assets have high depreciation deductions, which, in turn, allow them to use less debt. Kester (1986) provides empirical support of this negative relation for Japan. We use the ratio of depreciation charges to total assets.
-12-Volatility of Profitability. High operating risk increases the probability and cost of bankruptcy.
Therefore, high-operating-risk firms tend to use less debt than low-operating-risk firms (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim,1984; Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn,1992) . We employ the standard deviation of the previous five years' operating income over sales.
Keiretsu. This is a dummy variable equal to zero for independent firms and one for keiretsu firms.
This index is determined from the group's influence power, which is the ratio of group's shareholding to the total shares held by the top ten shareholders. Keiretsu membership is readily identifiable and stays rather stable over time-the switch-in and -out of membership (especially when a weak membership is not counted) is very rare. Following Wu and Xu (2002) , keiretsu firms are the group firms from the classification by Nakatani (1984) or the closely affiliated members (with the degree of the 2-, 3-, and 4-star inclinations) of the six keiretsu groups from the classification in the 1992/93 edition of Industrial Groupings in Japan-the Anatomy of the Keiretsu. Other firms that do not fall in either of the above classifications belong to non-keiretsu firms. Nakatani(1984) suggest that that keiretsu firms are associated with higher levels of debt because of the smaller risk of bankruptcy for keiretsu firms since banks are the principle shareholders of these firms.
Industry classification. According to Titman(1984) , a firm's liquidation can impose costs on its customers if it makes products that require maintenance in the future. However, customers take into account the liquidation likelihood and reduce demand and prices of the products, as a result, companies in certain industries, such as those that produce machines and equipment, may have high indirect bankruptcy costs and, therefore, have to bond themselves by choosing capital structures with relatively low leverage. Titman and Wessels (1988) provide empirical support for this contention. To examine unique industry effects, we include a series of dummy variables to identify industry classification. Firms in manufacturing industries are equal to 1, otherwise equal to 0.
Managerial Ownership Equation
RSTD is the stock return volatility measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns of the firm over a five-year period. Because their human capital is tied to the firm, managers would be reluctant to commit their personal wealth to the firm as this greatly diminishes their diversification opportunities. Further, this non-diversification problem becomes more severe as the stock return volatility of the firm increase. To capture this effect, the standard deviation of monthly stock returns estimated over five years is used to proxy for total risk. Based on the argument put forth, a negative coefficient for PSTD is hypothesized.
R&D and Advertising expenses variable is defined as before and captures the discretionary investments of the firm. Since these investments are characterized by greater agency costs (Myers, 1977) , R&D and Advertising intensive firms should be associated with greater insider ownership in equilibrium. Consequently, a positive coefficient is hypothesized for the R&D and Advertising expenses.
-13-Growth represents total asset growth and is anticipated to have a positive influence on managerial ownership. To the extent that past asset growth reflects future profitability and growth potential, managers would be less reluctant to invest in the firm's equity. The positive relationship between growth and managerial ownership could stem from informational advantages to insiders about growth prospects of the firm. Managers would be more inclined than the average investor to bet on the growth prospects because of their better knowledge of projects being undertaken by the firms.
Size is still measured as the log of total assets of the firm. previous studies have documented that managerial ownership is much greater in smaller firms than in larger firms. As the firm gets larger, a relatively smaller proportion of shares are owned by managers owing to their limited personal wealth, constraints on personal borrowing, and the diversification problem. Therefore, a negative coefficient for size is expected.
Bank, non-bank and business corporate ownership are all institutional ownership. The substitutability arguments suggest that the optimal proportion of managerial ownership should decline with increasing institutional monitoring. A negative coefficient is expected for institutional ownership.
Leverage is the same as before. The substitutability argument suggests an inverse relationship between managerial ownership and the debt ratio. A negative coefficient for Leverage is anticipated.
Year dummies for each year are included in regressions to capture unobserved macroeconomic effects.
The additional test for keiretsu members
Previous empirical studies suggest that there exit two distinct systems of corporate governance between the independent firms and the keiretsu members. The independent firms are much more similar to U.S. firms in their arms-length relationships with financiers and trading partners. The weaker ties that exist between independent firms and their stakeholders suggest that methods of monitoring and influencing management may rely more directly on the size of the shareholder's equity holdings, as is the case in the U.S. Hence further test are conducted to examine the role of keiretsu vs. non-keiretsu firms.
Sample Selection
For each year, firms are ranked according to their fiscal year-end M/B. The bottom quartile is selected to represent firms with low growth opportunities. The top quartile is selected to represent firms with high growth opportunities.
To be included in the sample for further analysis, we require the observations satisfied several conditions: -14-1) the managerial ownership is available. If the manager ownership is not on the top 10 shareholders list in the Company Handbook, the observation will be excluded. To take into account the possible confounding effects of management (director) entrenchment, the observations with managerial ownership greater than 50 percent will also be excluded.
According to Shleifer and Vishny(1989) , the correlation between management ownership and agency costs is "U" shaped. In other words, agency costs decline from low to moderated levels of management ownership as a result of the alignment of interest between managers and shareholders. However, at very high levels of management share ownership, agency costs increase as a result of management entrenchment. An analysis of this relation is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, all observations with director ownership greater than 50 percent are excluded.
2) The observations have no missing value for Leverage Ratio, Free Cash Flow, and standard deviation of operating income to sales over 5 years.
3) For the 2-equation system model, the observations should have no missing value of the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a five year period.
A breakdown of low-growth and high-growth firms by year, industry, and Keiretsu classification is provided in Table- 
Descriptive statistics
Table-2 provides descriptive statistics for low-growth and high-growth firms. The first column identifies the variables, the second and third columns provide descriptive statistics for each subsample, and the last column reports the p-value for the difference in means (median) between the two subsamples.
-15-As expected, high-growth firms have lower amount of debt in their capital structure than low-growth firms. The mean (median) leverage for high-growth firms is 20.2 percent (18.7 percent), compared to a mean (median) of 68.2 percent (71.5 percent) for low-growth firms. Both the t-test and the Wilcoxon test indicate that the difference between the two subsamples is significant (p<0.01). This is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis in which firms with fewer growth opportunities have higher levels of leverage.
The difference in the Growth Opportunities (M/B ratio) between the two subsamples is significant (p<0.01). The mean (median) M/B for the high-growth subsample is 2.276 (2.065), compared to a mean (median) of 1.167 (1.144) for the low-growth subsample.
There is also evidence that ownership structure differs between the two subsamples. Low-growth firms have lower managerial ownership and non-bank, business corporate ownership but higher bank ownership than high-growth firms. The mean (median) managerial ownership for low-growth firms is 6.7 percent (4.4 percent), compared to a mean (median) of 8.6 percent(6 percent) for high-growth firms. The mean (median) non-bank ownership for low-growth firms is 6.5 percent (5.8 percent), compared to a mean (median) of 7.9 percent (6.4 percent) for high-growth firms. The mean (median) business corporate ownership for low-growth firms is 10.1 percent (5.2 percent), compared to a mean (median) of 11.9 percent (8.1) percent for high-growth firms. On the other hand, the mean (median) bank ownership for low-growth firms is 9.1 percent (9 percent), compared to a mean (median) of 8.3 percent (8.6 percent) for high-growth firms. Based on difference in means, managerial and business corporate ownership differ significantly (p<0.01) between the two subsamples. Bank and non-bank ownership differ less significantly (p<0.05).
Regressing Results
The regression analyses are conducted in three stages. The results show a significant negative relation between leverage and growth opportunities. The coefficient for growth opportunities for low-growth and high-growth firms are -0.508 and -0.073, respectively, and statistically significant. The coefficient for low-growth firms is much lower than that for the high-growth firms. This findings lend support to the Jesen's (1986) argument that firms with few profitable investments are "bonding their promise to pay out future cash flows" by increasing debt.
Results suggest that firms with greater agency costs of free cash flow use more leverage. The coefficients on free cash flow for low-growth and high-growth firms are 1.169 and 0.756, respectively, and statistically significant. This is consistent with Jensen (1986) .
There is also evidence that the sensitivity of relations between ownership structure and leverage varies with growth opportunities and Free Cash Flow. The coefficients on managerial ownership for low-growth and high-growth firms are -0.195 and 0.010, respectively, and not significant.
The coefficient on the bank ownership for low-growth and high-growth firms are -0.645 and 0.395, respectively, and significant (p<0.01). The coefficient on non-bank ownership for low-growth and high-growth firms are -0.401 and 0.180, respectively, and significant(p<0.10).
The coefficient on business corporate ownership for low-growth firms is -0.090 and not significant, while the coefficient for high-growth firms is 0.190 and significant(p<0.01). These findings provide support to Hypothesis 2 that divergence of interest between shareholders and managers over capital structure is greater for low-growth firms, and therefore the role of equity ownership in mitigating the overinvestment problem is more important for these firms. In this kind of firms, leverage declines as managerial ownership, bank ownership, non-bank ownership and business corporate ownership rise. As suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , managerial ownership aligns the interest between managers and shareholders. Firms with high managerial ownership have lower agency costs of free cash flow, they need less leverage to control the agency problem. However, when the bank and non-bank financial institutions provide valuable monitoring services and act as a restraint to opportunistic behavior by managers, firms find it optimal to use lower level of leverage, which is an alternative mechanism to reduce the agency conflicts. For high-growth firms, which has less agency cost of free cash flow, there is no compensation relation between leverage and institutional ownerships. The institutions are responsible for the higher leverage ratio.
-17-While most of the control variables have signs as expected based on theories of capital structure.
The coefficient for profitability is negative. It support for the pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf(1984) . Consistent with Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim(1984), we find a positive relation between debt and collateral values and negative relation between debt and earning volatility. For the low-growth firms, the positive sign for size is consistent with Jensen, Solberg, Zorn(1992) and Hodder and Tschoegl(1985) and shows that the ability to support more debt. The negative coefficient for R&D supports for Myers ' (1977) hypothesis that R&D-intensive firms, incur high agency costs because of their greater discretionary investment. The negative coefficient for R&D is also consistent with BJK's finding. For the low-growth firms, the negative coefficient supports Titman's (1984) argument that the uniqueness of the assts is expected to be negatively related to leverage. The depreciation reflecting non-debt tax shield is with a negative sign, which provide support for DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) . The coefficient for Keiretsu dummy is negative, which show keiretsu firms have higher debt ratio than non-keiretsu firms. The result is consistent with the finding of Nakatani(1984) . Finally, industry dummy variable exhibit significantly positive signs. This is consistent with Titman's (1984) contention that firms in nonunique industries tend to have higher leverage than those in unique industries.
Two exceptions is the Size and Advertising expenses for high-growth firms. The coefficient on Size for high-growth firms are -0.0008 but insignificant. The coefficient on advertising expenses for high-growth firms is 0.103 and significant. A possible explanation is that the advertising adds value to the firm, which increases borrowing capacity. Table 4 With respect to the Managerial ownership equation, most of the signs of the coefficients are in the direction hypothesized. As predicted, the bank ownership, non-bank ownership and business ownership has a significant negative coefficient as hypothesized. It was argued that institutional ownership fosters additional monitoring and acts as a restraint to the opportunistic behavior on the managers. The negative coefficient for R&D is consist with the Myers' hypothesis that R&D-intensive firms are associated with greater agency cost of debt making managerial ownership a relatively more important device in controlling the agency problem of the firm. For the high-growth firms, the positive coefficient of Growth is consistent with managers' preference to invest in the firm's equity if future prospects are good. This coefficient for low-growth firms is negative, but insignificant. The negative coefficient for size is consistent with previous studies that document a lower proportion of managerial ownership in larger firms owing to limited personal resources. The exception is the volatility of stock return. The sign is significantly positive, but it is near 0.
The results of two-equation model
The results of Lag model -18-
The results for regression using lagged dependent variable for the year 1992 to 1999 are reported in Table 5 . As noted, these results are far more meaningful than the OLS given the lag between the identification of growth opportunities and the dependent variable. The results show that for the low-growth firms, the free cash flow is positively related with the leverage. The growth opportunities is negatively related with the leverage. The bank ownership is negatively related with the leverage. For the high-growth firms, the free cash flow is negatively related with the leverage, the growth opportunities is negatively related with the leverage. The bank ownership and business ownership are positively related with the leverage. All the results are significant. 
Regressing results
Further tests are conducted to examine the role of Keiretsu vs. Non-keiretsu firms. As in the earlier case, three set of regression are run; using the OLS, 2-SLS and lagged dependent variable.
The results are reported in Table 7 , Table 8 , and Table 9 .
Here, we only discuss the results of the OLS in detail since the results of 2SLS and Lagged dependent variable are materially identical. For the independent firms, the results show the association between leverage and free cash flow, growth opportunities, and the impact of the ownership structures are similar to the earlier results. For the low-growth independent firms, the coefficient on free cash flow is 1.222 (p<0.10), much high than 0.852 (p<0.05) for high-growth firms. The coefficient on growth opportunities is -0.505(p<0.01), much lower than -0.071 (p<0.01) for high-growth firms. For low-growth independent firms, the relation between leverage and managerial ownership and institutional ownerships are negative and the coefficient of bank ownership, and non-bank ownership are significant. For the high-growth independent firms, leverage is positively related with managerial ownership and institutional ownerships and the coefficients of bank, non-bank ownership and business ownership are significant. The results is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis in which firms with fewer growth opportunities have greater agency costs of free cash flow and use more leverage. For the low-growth independent firms, the bank investors may impose their managerial preferences through the governance process, e.g. the bank investors seek to increase their oversight on firms through sending their representatives to sit on the boards. Hence, the bank ownership and leverage serve as substitute in controlling the managerial self-interest. For the high-growth independent firms, the non-bank and business corporate investors exercise their influence through eliciting higher leverage to control the overinvestment problem. One possible explanation is the difficulties for the institutional ownership to gather and interpreting information on this kind of firms because of the need of specific industry knowledge since they are not affiliated with the keiretsu through business ties and reciprocal shareholdings. These difficulties deter the institutional investor to control the agency problem through governance process.
-20-For the keiretsu firms, the results are mixed. For the low-growth keiretsu firms, the coefficients on the free cash flow and growth opportunities are -0.760 and -0.204 respectively, and insignificant. The relation between the leverage and non-bank ownership and business ownership are positive and significant, which show the bank and business corporate investors elicit higher leverage for the low-growth keiretsu firms. The result of low-growth firms doesn't lend much support to the Hypotheses of free cash flow. One possible explanation is that this kind of firms rely monitoring methods other than leverage and ownership structure to control the agency problems. For the high-growth keiretsu firms, the coefficient on free cash flow and growth opportunities are 3.391 (p<0.01) and -0.075 (p<0.05) respectively, compared to the 0.279 (insignificant) and -0.096(p<0.01) of high-growth independent firms respectively, which show the agency problem of free cash flow is more severe in the keiretsu members due to their easy borrowing. The relation between the leverage and non-bank ownership is negative and significant, which show the institutional ownership compensate for the leverage in monitoring the problem of free cash flow. The relation between the leverage and managerial ownership is -0.784 and significant at 10.96% ( significant at 9.95% in the system regression), which show the managerial ownership compensate for the leverage in this kind of firms. Table 10 presents the results of three kinds of firms. The coefficient of free cash flow for the low-growth high free cash flow firms is the highest in the three subsamples. The coefficient of free cash flow for the high-growth low free cash flow is the lowest in the three subsamples. The coefficient of growth opportunities for the low-growth high free cash flow firms is the lowest in the three subsamples. The coefficient of growth opportunities for the high-growth low free cash flow is the highest in the three subsamples. The coefficient of ownership are all negative for the low-growth high free cash flow firms and that of bank ownership is significant (p<0.01). The coefficients of ownership are all positive for the high-growth low free cash flow firms and the coefficients of bank and nonbank ownership are significant (p<0.05). The results indicate that the control devices of leverage and ownership structure are most important for Low-growth high free cash flow firms, i.e., the firms with the most severe overinvestment problems. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of the free cash flow hypothesis concerning the disciplinary role of ownership structure in corporate capital structure policy. The investigation is motivated by the theoretical work of Jensen (1986) and Stulz(1990) on managerial overinvestment incentives. Based on the previous theoretical work, this study hypothesizes that associations between ownership structure and leverage vary cross-sectionally with growth opportunities and free cash flow and there are compensation relation between leverage and managerial ownership, leverage and institutional ownership.
We find that the sensitivity of ownership structure to leverage depends on growth opportunities and free cash flow. When firms in the sample are classified as low-growth and high-growth firms, relation between leverage and free cash flow are significantly greater for low-growth firms than for the high-growth firms. Moreover, we observe evidence that firms with more severe overinvestment problem have higher levels of leverage and the coefficient of free cash flow are significantly positive, consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. In addition, the results indicate that in the firms with more severe overinvestment problem, institutional investors discourage managerial overspending by governance process and hence compensate for the debt monitoring (i.e., the substitutive monitoring mechanism). The managerial ownership may aligns the interest of shareholders and mangers and also compensates for the leverage (although the result is insignificant.),. In the firms with less overinvestment problem, institutional investors encourage higher leverage.
Moreover, our results indicate that keiretsu classification affects relations between ownership structure and leverage. The impact of institutional ownership on leverage is different for keiretsu and independent firms. The role of institutional ownership that compensate for the debt monitoring is more pronounced for low-growth independent firms and high-growth keiretsu firms while the role of managerial ownership is only pronounced for the high-growth keiretsu firms.
Overall, the results generally support the hypothesis that conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers vary with growth opportunities and free cash flow and there is disciplinary role of ownership structure in capital structure policy. For low-independent FCF p=0.115 
Table1. Year, Industry, and Keiretsu Distribution for Low-growth and High-growth Firms
